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knowledge or state of mind is admissible in favor of and against the
principal...."35
The reasons behind the prima facie rule are apparent-public
policy considerations, and a belief by the courts that the declarations
have a degree of reliability due to the element of corroboration. The
policy considerations are indeed important in this area because the
operative facts of agency and course of employment are matters pe-
culiarly within the knowledge of the principal and the agent, and
it is frequently difficult for a plaintiff to establish them. But that
such declarations are reliable is open to question. It is submitted,
therefore, that policy considerations standing alone are an insufficient
basis to admit the hearsay declarations of the agent into evidence to
prove course of employment, unless the authority of the agent to
speak has been otherwise established.36
E. MICHAEL MASINTER
DIVORCE ON GROUND OF SEPARATION
In 196o the Virginia General Assembly enacted section 20-91(9) of
the Code. This section adds separation for three years to the statutory
grounds for divorce' and seems to indicate an intent on the part of
the legislature to depart from the previous divorce policy of the state.
Until the passage of this recent legislation, Virginia had main-
tained a policy opposing divorce by consent.2 This policy was based
on the concept that marriages, although entered into by the agree-
ment of the parties, cannot be terminated by the agreement or con-
sent of the parties, as the state has an interest in the continued sta-
bility of the marriage relationship.3 The state has heretofore pro-
n163 F.2d 71, 73 (1947), quoting the Restatement of Agency, supra note 32.
"Professor Charles V. Laughlin suggests that the same result could have been
obtained in the Turner case without admitting the hearsay declarations, if the court
had regarded the Thayer presumption (See Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 105,
112, 7 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1940)) as an inference type rather than a policy type presump-
tion. Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1481, 1506 (196o). Using the in-
ference approach, once the defendant introduces rebutting evidence the presumption
of course of employment, which arises from proof of ownership and employment,
would disappear; but the inference connected with it would remain as a question for
the jury. Therefore, in cases such as Turner the jury would still be allowed to de-
termine the question of course of employment. For a detailed discussion see Laugh-
lin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195, 218
(1953).
'Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9) (Supp. 1960).
2Grim v. Grim, 126 Va. 245, 1o S.E. 140 (1919).
S1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 3.o4 (2d ed. 1945).
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tected its interest in marriage by granting divorces only upon the
grounds of fault set forth in the statute.4 Even when parties have been
separated for years and the marriage relationship is factually, if not
legally, at an end, the Virginia courts have consistently refused to
grant a legal termination. It is said that "mere separation by mutual
consent is not a desertion by either party." 5 Furthermore, when the
courts have suspected collusion between the parties, they have re-
quired a strict degree of proof that the defendant was truly at fault.6
This policy is clearly shown in section 20-99 of the Code of Vir-
ginia 7 which relates to divorce procedure. In Bailey v. Bailey the
court elaborated upon the scope and purpose of this statute saying:
"[A]ll that was intended by [the statute] ... was to put in the
form of a statutory enactment, that principle which had been
well settled by the ecclesiastical courts of England and the whole
current of decisions of the courts of the States of the Union, to
wit, that a divorce would never be granted merely upon the
consent, or on the default of the party charged, but only on
proof of the cause alleged." s
It should be noted that section 2o-99 was left unamended by the
196o General Assembly. It is difficult to see how a case decided under
the recently enacted section 20-91(9), which provides for divorce
solely on the ground of separation for three years, can be reconciled
with the doctrine of Bailey v. Bailey.
The belief that divorce should be granted only upon substantial
grounds of fault is well-rooted in our legal traditions and no doubt
has its basis in ecclesiastical doctrine.9 However, other legal systems
I"The power to grant divorces in Virginia is purely statutory. Section 63 of our
Constitution reads: 'The General Assembly shall confer on the courts power to grant
divorces,' etc. From this it follows that that the courts have no power except such as
is in this manner conferred upon them." White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 166, 24 S.E.2d
448, 450 (1943).
rDevers v. Devers, 115 Va. 517, 79 S.E. 1o48 (1913).
6"[The legislature] having specified particularly the causes for which the courts
might sever the ties which bind together husband and wife, their purpose was to
prevent a divorce from being obtained by the collusion of the parties." Bailey v.
Bailey, 68 Va. (21 Gratt.) 43, 50 (1871).
"The courts should consider the testimony in an uncontested application for a
divorce with the most painstaking and scrupulous care, and if collusion or consent
appears, directly or indirectly, should deny the relief sought." Dinsmore v. Dins-
more, 128 Va. 403, 414, 104 S.E. 785, 788 (1920).
Wa. Code Ann. § 20-99 (1950):
"Such suit shall be instituted and conducted as other suits in equity, except
that the bill shall not be taken for confessed, nor shall a divorce be granted on the
uncorroborated testimony of the parties or either of them. ...
8Bailey v. Bailey, 68 Va. (21 Gratt.) 43, 50 (1871).
OLitchenberger, Divorce-A Social Interpretation 77-94 (1931).
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have not adhered to this principle. For example, under Jewish rab-
binical law a husband and wife who agree to effect a dissolution of
the marriage ties may do so. 10 In recent years such consent divorces
have been permitted under the laws of Belgium, Norway, Portugal,
and Russia."
No jurisdiction in this country has yet adopted the policy of the
immediate consent divorce; but many have done away, at least par-
tially, with the notion of "fault" by the passage of the separation or
living apart statutes. The statutes generally provide that when the
parties have lived apart for a specified period of time without co-
habitation, such separation constitutes a ground for divorce. 12 The
public policy consideration behind these separation statutes is that
when a husband and wife have lived apart for the required length
of time and have no intention of resuming conjugal relations, the
best interests of society and of the parties themselves will be pro-
moted by a dissolution of the marriage bond. 3 Today, twenty-four
jurisdictions in this country have adopted statutes which to some de-
gree embody this policy. A summary of these statutes appears in the
appendix at the end of this comment.
The length of time for which the parties are required to live
apart varies widely. Generally, the period of separation is from three
to five years, although Rhode Island requires a ten year separation
and Louisiana and North Carolina require only a two year separation.
It should also be noted that the legislatures tend to reduce the re-
quired period of separation after the statutes have been in effect rather
than to lengthen them. For example, Texas reduced the required time
of separation from ten years to seven years; similarly, Louisiana re-
duced the length of separation from seven years to two years.14
In general, the living apart statutes make divorce on grounds of
separation available to either party regardless of fault, but there are
exceptions. The Vermont and Wyoming statutes specifically deny the
party at fault the right to bring suit.'5 While the North Carolina
statute makes no mention of fault, the courts of that state have
interpreted the statute as barring the party at fault from utilizing
the statutory ground of separation.'6
'0See Silbermuntz v. Silbermuntz, 97 N.J. Eq. 451, 129 At. 420, 421 (Ch. 1925).
'2o Colum. L. Rev. 472 n.28 (1920).
L-'Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 455 (3 d ed., Morland 1946) .
1
3Annot., 51 A.L.R. 763 (1927).
"See appendix infra.
' hVt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1958); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 20-47 (1957).
"'Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943).
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The most significant problem which will face the Virginia courts
in the application of the new statute will be to determine the nature
of the separation contemplated. An examination of the statutes of
other jurisdictions reveals that there are three distinct types of separa-
tion. Five jurisdictions require that the separation be pursuant to
court decrees; 17 five are restrictive in allowing divorce only after a
voluntary separation; 18 while the statutes of twelve allow divorce
regardless of the voluntariness of the separation.' 9
An analysis of the Virginia statute requires the drawing of a dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary separation. A separation
that is voluntary is one entered into. by an agreement between the
two parties.20 There must be an intent to separate, and there must be
an element of mutual consent.21 If, on the other hand, one party with-
draws against the wishes of the other, the separation is classified as
involuntary.22 In some states that do not require a voluntary separa-
tion, a separation of any sort for the statutory period may suffice.23
The statutes of some states explicitly require that the separation
must be voluntary, while others do not. Generally, those statutes
which require that the separation be voluntary are similarly worded.
For example, the Delaware statute allows divorce "when [the] husband
and wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without any
cohabitation for three consecutive years .... 24 In Delaware the
statute has been interpreted as meaning that the voluntary separa-
tion referred to must be, either explicitly or tacitly, the action of both
parties.2 5 -The District of Columbia statute provides, "A divorce from
the bond of marriage ... may be granted for ... voluntary separation
from bed and board for five consecutive years without cohabita-
ton....,28 For a plaintiff to be entitled to a divorce under this sec-
1TAlabama, Colorado, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah. Wisconsin permits
divorce after five years voluntary separation or five years separation pursuant to a
judgment of legal separation. See appendix infra.
mDelaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
See appendix infra.
"Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, Puerto Rico, Rhode
Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See appendix infra.
2SParker v. Parker, 21o N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936). See also Annot., 166 A.L.R.
498 (1947).
2Nichols v. Nichols, 181 Md. 392, 3o A.2d 446 (943).
"Butler v. Butler, 154 F.2d 2o3 (D.C. Cir. 1946); See Campbell v. Campbell,
174 Md. 229, 198 Ad. 414. (1938).
. ONorth v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12,41
P.2d 1059 (1935).
2'Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1522 (Supp. 1958).
25Rolph v. Rolph, 149 A.2d 744 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959).
21D.C. Code Ann. § 16-4o3 (1951).
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tion, it must be established that the separation was voluntary at the
outset, or that the defendant's acquiescence made the separation vol-
untary in the statutory sense.27 The Maryland statute provides for di-
vorce when the parties "shall have voluntarily lived separate and
apart, without any cohabitation, for three consecutive years prior to
the filing of the bill of complaint...."28 The Maryland court has
held that a voluntary separation connotes more than a physical separa-
tion29 and requires a common intent and mutual consent to sep-
arate and not resume marital relations. 30 A separation, involun-
tary in its inception may later become voluntary if the parties mani-
fest agreement in a common intent not to live together again.31 How-
ever, in contrast to the District of Columbia ruling,32 it is held in
Maryland that the separation must continue without interruption for
three years from the time of agreement before either spouse is en-
titled to a divorce under the statute.33 The Wisconsin statute
3 4 is
similar to that of Maryland. Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Wisconsin thus constitute the bloc of jurisdictions
whose statutes specify that the separation must be voluntary.
The North Carolina statute does not use the word "voluntary";
however, the North Carolina court has interpreted the statute to re-
quire that there must be an element of mutuality between the husband
and wife when the separation is effected.3 5 Thus North Carolina by
judicial interpretation falls into the "voluntary" group.
On the other hand, a majority of the statutes do not require that
the separation be voluntary. The statutes of this group make no qual-
ification as to the type of separation and the courts have generally held
that a voluntary separation or agreement of any sort is not neces-
sary.36 In such jurisdictions a divorce may be granted no matter what
the original cause of the separation.3 7 For example, in Kentucky the
statute provides that a divorce may be granted to either party on
2Butler v. Butler, 154 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
2Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 24 (1957).
2DBenson v. Benson, 204 Md. 6oi, 105 A.2d 733 (1954).
'0France v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md., 3o6, 4 A.2d 717 (1939).
nHahn v. Hahn, 192 Md. 561, 64 A.2d 739 (1949).
3See note 27 supra.
SMisner v. Misner, 211 Md. 398, 127 A.2d 547 (1956).
3Wis. Stat. § 247.07 (1959).
35Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945); Oliver v. Oliver, 219
N.C. 299, 13 S.E.2d 549 (1941).
3'Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944); Cotton v. Cotton, 3o6.
Ky. 826, 209 S.W.2d 474 (1948).
3VWogt V. Vogt, 2o5 Ky. 569, 266 S.W. 49 (1924); North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113
So. 852 (1927).
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the grounds of "living apart without any cohabitation for five con-
secutive years next before application."38 This has been held to mean
that the separation may be either voluntary or involuntary.39 The
Arkansas statute allows divorce for separation for three years "wheth-
er such separation was the voluntary act or by the mutual consent of
the parties .... "40 This statute has been interpreted as not requiring
agreement between the parties to separate.
41
In addition to the examination 'of treatment in other jurisdic-
tions, it is helpful to review the legislative history of the Virginia
statute in an effort to anticipate the interpretation that will be placed
upon it. As introduced in the Senate the bill42 followed almost ver-
batim the Maryland statute,4 3 which makes voluntary separation a
ground for divorce. This bill passed the Senate with only a slight
modification.44 In the House the bill was referred to the Committee
for Courts of Justice. It was reported out with an amendment eliminat-
ing the word "voluntary," and it was so passed by the House.4 5 The
Senate concurred in the amendment. The Act provides:
2o-91 A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed ...
(9) On the application of either party if and when the husband
OKy. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4o3.o20 (Supp. 1958).
'Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648, 291 S.W. 1032 (1927); Ward v. Ward, 213 Ky. 6o6,
281 S.W. 8o (1926).
"Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1959).
"Brooks v. Brooks, 2o Ark. 14, 143 S.W.9d 1o98 (1940); Parrish v. Parrish, 195
Ark. 766, 114 S.W.2d 29 (1938).
"2S.B. No. 54, offered January ig, 196o. See letter from Miss A. Clark Peirce,
Deputy Clerk of the Virginia House of Delegates, to Miss Louise Moore, Law Li-
brarian, Washington and Lee University, Oct. 2o, 196o, on file in The Washington
& Lee Law Review Office. The amendment was introduced to the Senate by Senator
Curry Carter of Staunton in the following form:
"A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed: ... (9) When-
ever it shall appear to the court that the husband and wife shall have vol-
untarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation, for three con-
secutive years prior to filing the bill of complaint, and such separation
is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation."
"The Maryland Statute provides a divorce may be granted "when the husband
and wife shall have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation,
for three consecutive years prior to the filing of the bill of complaint, and such sep-
aration is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation...." Md. Ann. Code
art. 16, § 24 (1957).
"The last phrase was changed from "and such separation is beyond any reason-
able expectation of reconciliation" to "and there is no probability of a reconcilia-
tion."
"The bill was referred by the House Committee for Courts of Justice to a sub-
committee consisting of Delamater Davis of Norfolk, R. Crockett Gwyn, Jr. of
Marion and Stanley A. Owens of Manassas. It was then reported out with an amend-
ment which was agreed to by the House. The amendment was in the language of the
final act as found in the 196o Code Supplement.
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and wife have lived apart and separate without any cohabitation
and without interruption for three years, and at the time of
separation were each resident and domiciled in Virginia. Di-
vorce on this ground shall not be granted where service of pro-
cess is by publication.
This provision is quite unlike the language of the Maryland
statute in that the word "voluntary" has been omitted so that the
final act more closely resembles the North Carolina statute. While the
North Carolina statute has been interpreted to require voluntary
separation, other jurisdictions whose statutes do not specify "volun-
tary" have not been interpreted to require a voluntary separation.46
There is, therefore, a basis for two different interpretations of the
new Virginia statute. It can be argued that the Senate intended to re-
quire the separation to be voluntary and that the House did not
change this basic intent. The logic supporting this argument is that
the original bill contained the word voluntary, which in the process
of amendment was deleted, but that the final bill is a close paraphrase
of the North Carolina statute which the North Carolina courts have
interpreted to require a voluntary separation.
Conversely, it can be argued that since the language of the Senate
bill was changed to delete the word "voluntary," the change must
have been intentional. Therefore, the final product is a statute re-
sembling the statutes of many of the states that do not require the
separation to be voluntary.
The Virginia statute does not specifically require the separation
to be voluntary. In following the literal wording in interpreting the
statute, the courts will be in accord with the underlying policy be-
hind these statutes. The separation and living apart statutes are in-
tended to provide a legal method for the dissolution of marriages
which are in fact already dissolved. When these unfortunate condi-
tions exist, it is against the underlying policy of such statutes to re-
quire the separation to be entered into by the mutual consent of the
parties, that is, voluntarily. The public policy behind such a statute is
to permit the dissolution of marriages when the husband and wife
have been living separate and apart for years with no intention of
reuniting. Whichever interpretation is decided upon, section 20-91(9)
constitutes a noteworthy addition to Virginia divorce law.
JOHN A. PAUL
'0 North Carolina seems to be the only jurisdiction that interprets a statute which
does not specifically require the separation to be voluntary as requiring the separa-
tion to be entered into by mutual consent or with some element of mutuality. See
note 35, supra.
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APPENDIX
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of divorce from bed and




Living apart without co-
habitation.$
Separation by force of a
decree of a court of rec-















arate and apart without
any cohabitation.1 0
'Ala. Code tit. 34, § 22(1) (1958).
2Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-312(7) (1956).
"Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-12 0 2 (Supp. 1959).
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-2(9) (Supp. 1958).
5Del. Code Ann. tit. i, 1 .52 (Supp. 1958).
'D.C. Code Ann. § 16-4o3 (1951).
'Idaho Code Ann. § 32-61o (1947).
sKy.-Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.020 (Supp. 1958).
9La. Rev. Stat. § 9:301 (1950).
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element of mutual con-
sent to separation.
4
Under decree for sepa-
rate maintenance.' 5





Lived separate under a
decree of separate main-
tenance.19
Living separate without
fault on part of libel-
ant 2 0
U'Minn. Stat. § 518.o6(8) (1945); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 71-8585( Supp. 1940).
"Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.010 (1957)-
"N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:7 (Supp. 1957).
'N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 (195o).
15N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0605 (1943).
"'P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 321(9) (1955)-
17R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-3 (1956).
ab'ex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art 4629(4) (Supp. 1954).
'DUtah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(8) (1953)-
-Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1958).
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